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Abstract
This work investigates the effect of finite-alphabet input constraint on the secrecy rate of a multi-
antenna wiretap channel. Existing works have characterized maximum achievable secrecy rate or secrecy
capacity for single and multiple antenna systems based on Gaussian source signals and secrecy code.
Despite the impracticality of Gaussian sources, the compact closed-form expression of mutual infor-
mation between linear channel Gaussian input and corresponding output has led to broad use of the
Gaussian input assumption in physical secrecy analysis. For practical considerations, we study the effect
of finite discrete-constellation on the achievable secrecy rate of multiple-antenna wire-tap channels.
Our proposed precoding scheme converts the underlying multi-antenna system into a bank of parallel
channels. Based on this precoding strategy, we develop a decentralized power allocation algorithm based
on dual decomposition to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. In addition, we analyze the achievable
secrecy rate for finite-alphabet inputs in low and high SNR regions. Our results demonstrate substantial
difference in secrecy rate between systems given finite-alphabet inputs and systems with Gaussian inputs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications, with increasing coverage and applications, are vulnerable to po-
tential security compromises such as passive eavesdropping and active jamming. Traditionally,
network planners have relegated system security considerations to higher network layers of the
OSI protocol stack through authentication and cryptography. However, in recent years, there have
been growing research interests in the security analysis of wireless systems from a physical layer
and information theoretic perspective. In a wiretap channel environment originally introduced
by Wyner [?], a sender “Alice” wishes to transmit a secret message to the intended receiver
“Bob” in the presence of a passive eavesdropper “Eve”. Wyner [?] showed that when the Alice-
to-Eve channel is degraded from the Alice-to-Bob channel, Alice can encode and send secure
messages to the destination at a non-zero secrecy rate. In [?], a generalization for the non-
degraded broadcast channel is proposed, and in [?], secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap
channel is shown to be achievable by adopting a random Gaussian codebook. In [?], the secrecy
capacity of a multi-antenna Gaussian wiretap channel is shown to be achievable using a suitable
input covariance matrix and by encoding the message using a Gaussian random codebook.
For both single- and multi-antenna Gaussian wiretap channels, the codebook that achieves
secrecy capacity turns out to be Gaussian. However, such codebooks are not implementable in
practice. In real world systems, input codebook consists of finite set of equi-probable constellation
points (e.g. M -QAM, M -PAM etc.). Therefore, in contrast to the Gaussian codebook, practical
wiretap codes must consist of finite-alphabet symbols. Because of this constraint, the achievable
secrecy rate for a finite-alphabet input scenario would differ from the secrecy rate achieved by
a Gaussian codebook.
A recent work [?] considered the effect of M -PAM input on the secrecy rate of a Gaussian
wiretap channel and provided the necessary condition for power allocation to maximize the
achievable secrecy rate. In [?], results were also extended to the case of parallel Gaussian wiretap
channels. In [?], we have investigated the effect of finite-alphabet input on the ergodic secrecy
rate of a multiple-input single-output and single-eavesdropper (MISOSE) system. To continue
our progresses in this work, we investigate the effect of finite-alphabet input in a more general
setting of a multiple-input multiple-output and multiple-eavesdropper (MIMOME) system. The
specific contributions of the work are summarized below :
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• In order to quantify the effect of finite-alphabet input on MIMOME systems, we propose the
application of precoding matrix to transform the MIMOME channel into a bank of parallel
channels.
• We propose a power allocation optimization framework based on decentralized dual decom-
position technique to maximize the achievable secrecy rate of MIMOME systems with an
arbitrary but known input distribution.
• We provide secrecy rate analysis of MIMOME systems with finite-alphabet inputs at low
and high SNR regions. Our findings suggest that similar to the Gaussian wiretap channel,
proper transmission power should be diverted at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in case
of finite-alphabet input albeit with different effect.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We begin with the system model in section II. In
section III we propose a linear precoding scheme that transforms the MIMOME wiretap channel
into a set of parallel channels. Based on this precoding scheme, we reformulate the secrecy
rate problem for an arbitrary input distribution. In section IV, we develop a decentralized power
allocation algorithm based on dual decomposition that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate for
an arbitrary distribution. In section V, we further consider the special case of Gaussian input and
present a modified water-filling power allocation strategy by considering the secrecy constraint.
We then extend the modified water-filling power allocation scheme to analyze the secrecy rate
for an arbitrary input distribution in both low and high SNR regions. In section VI we present
numerical results before concluding with section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Throughout this work, we use notations tr(.), det(.) and superscript {·}H , respectively, to
denote the trace, the determinant, and the conjugate transpose of a matrix.
A. System Model
We consider a MIMO (multiple-input multiple-output) wiretap system model in which the
transmitter (Alice), the intended receiver (Bob), and the passive eavesdropper (Eve), respectively,
have ma (transmit), mb (receive), and me (eavesdrop) antennas. Denote the received signals at
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Bob and Eve as yb and ye, respectively. Their received signals are written as
yb = Hbx + nb (1)
ye = Hex + ne (2)
where Hb ∈ Cmb×ma and He ∈ Cme×ma denote, respectively, the flat-fading MIMO channels,
from Alice-to-Bob and from Alice-to-Eve. The noise nb ∈ Cmb and ne ∈ Cme are zero-mean
identity matrix variance complex Gaussian random vectors independent of each other. The data
signal is x ∈ Cma transmitted by Alice in the form of x = Ws, in which W is a linear
precoding matrix. We denote s as a random vector with zero mean entries and identity correlation
matrix. We constrain the total transmission power by a peak level PT , i.e., tr{Kx} ≤ PT , where
Kx = E{xxH} is the covariance matrix of the transmitted signal vector.
The secrecy capacity of the above system is achievable by using a Gaussian random codebook
[?]. First, let A  B denote that A − B is non-negative definite. The secrecy capacity is the
solution of the following optimization problem
maximize
Kx
log det
(
I + HbKxH
H
b
)− log det (I + HeKxHHe )
subject to : Kx  0, Kx = KHx
tr (Kx) ≤ PT .
(3)
In order to realize an achievable secrecy rate for an arbitrary input signaling, we will generalize
the objective function. Instead of the optimal Gaussian signaling as used in the above optimization
problem, we replace the objective function with the more general form of I (x; yb)− I (x; ye),
where I (x; y) represents the mutual information between the input and output vectors x and y.
The optimization problem described in (3) is a non-convex optimization problem (except
for the special case of mb = me = 1 [?], [?]). Even for simple cases, the objective function
possesses a number of local maxima. Therefore, the optimum value of Kx is in general not
known. In particular, for an arbitrary input signaling without any closed-form mutual information,
solving the above optimization problem can be a difficult task. Thus, instead of solving the
above optimization problem, we consider a particular linear precoding scheme similar to the one
provided in [?]. The proposed linear precoding scheme first transforms the MIMOME channel
into a bank of parallel channels. This step allows us to gain a better understanding of the
effect of finite-alphabet input on the secrecy of the system. It enables us to gain better insights
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into future system implementation. Such linear precoding scheme is justifiable from practical
system implementation perspective. In addition, at high SNR, such precoding scheme is known
to achieve the capacity of a MIMOME system [?].
B. Preliminaries
Definition 1: Similar to [?], we define the following subspaces
Sb = null (Hb)⊥ ∩ null (He)
Sb,e = null (Hb)⊥ ∩ null (He)⊥
Se = null (Hb) ∩ null (He)⊥
Sn = null (Hb) ∩ null (He) .

In fact, subspace Sb corresponds to the class of input with non-zero gain towards the direction
of Bob only. Subspace Sb,e corresponds to the class of input with non-zero gain in the direction
of both Bob and Eve. Se corresponds to the class of input with non-zero gain in the direction
of Eve only. Finally, Sn is the subspace with non-zero gain in the direction occupied by neither
Bob nor Eve. Define k = rank
([
HHb H
H
e
]H)
and hence dim (Sn) = ma − k. In addition,
we define, r = dim (Sb) and s = dim (Sr,e). Therefore, dim (Se) = k − r − s.
Definition 2: We recall the following definition of generalized singular value decomposition
(GSVD) [?], [?] that we will use for our analysis. The GSVD of the pair (Hb,He) takes the
following form
Hb = Ψb Σb
[ k ma−k
Ω−1 0
]
ΨHa
He = Ψe Σe
[ k ma−k
Ω−1 0
]
ΨHa
where Ψa ∈ Cma×ma , Ψb ∈ Cmb×mb , and Ψe ∈ Cme×me are unitary matrices. Ω ∈ Ck×k is a
non-singular matrix. Σb ∈ Cmb×k and Σe ∈ Cme×k have the following form
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Σb =

k−r−s s r
mb−r−s 0 0 0
s 0 Db 0
r 0 0 I

Σe =

k−r−s s r
k−r−s I 0 0
s 0 De 0
me−k+r 0 0 0

Db = diag ({b1, . . . , bs}) and De = diag ({e1, . . . , es}) are diagonal real matrices with dimension
s× s. The diagonal entries of Db and De are arranged in the following orders:
0 < b1 ≤ . . . bs < 1
1 > e1 ≥ . . . ≥ es > 0
and
b2i + e
2
i = 1, for i = 1, . . . , s.

III. SECRECY RATE PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Proposed Precoding Strategy
Given the above two definitions in hand, we propose the following precoding matrix
W = ΨaBP
1/2 (4)
where, B is defined as follows
B =

k ma−k
k Ω 0
ma−k 0 0
 (5)
P = diag ({p1, . . . , pma}) is a diagonal power allocation matrix. The proposed precoding matrix
in Eq. (4) is similar to the precoding strategy defined in [?]. However, unlike the precoding
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H˜b =

k−r−s s r ma−k
mb−r−s 0 0 0 0
s 0 diag
({
b1
√
pk−r−s+1, . . . , bs
√
pk−r
})
0 0
k 0 0 diag
({√
pk−r+1, . . . ,
√
pk
})
0

(10)
H˜e =

k−r−s s ma−k+r
k−r−s diag
({√
p1, . . . ,
√
pk−r−s
})
0 0
s 0 diag
({
e1
√
pk−r−s+1, . . . , es
√
pk−r
})
0
me−k+r 0 0 0

(11)
scheme in [?], the diagonal elemens {pi} in the power allocaion matrix can have different
values. As will be evident in the subsequent sections, such differentiation is extremely important
due to the finite nautre of the input constellations considered in this work.
By using the above precoding strategy, the system equations of (1), (2) become
yb = Ψb Σb
[ k ma−k
I 0
]
P
1/2 s + nb (6)
ye = Ψe Σe
[ k ma−k
I 0
]
P
1/2 s + ne. (7)
Pre-multiplying (6) and (7) with ΨHb and Ψ
H
e , respectively, we have the following equivalent
equations
y˜b = H˜b s + n˜b (8)
y˜e = H˜e s + n˜e, (9)
where we use the notations y˜b = ΨHb yb, y˜e = Ψ
H
e ye, n˜b = Ψ
H
b nb and n˜e = Ψ
H
e ne. The new
equivalent channel matrices H˜b = Σb
[
I 0
]
P1/2 and H˜e = Σe
[
I 0
]
P1/2 are specified in
Eqs. (10) and (11).
From Eqs. (10), (11), we observe that the new system equations (8), (9) in fact transform
the MIMOME system (1), (2) into a bank of parallel channels. Fig. 1 shows the resulting
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parallel channel model. In this parallel channel model, input symbols s1, . . . , sk−r−s are only
observed by Eve, symbols sk−r−s+1, . . . , sk−r are received by both Bob and Eve, whereas symbols
sk−r+1, . . . , sk are only received by Bob. Finally, symbols sk+1, . . . , sma are lost by receivers of
both Bob and Eve.
B. Reformulation of Secrecy Rate Problem
In this section, we relax the secrecy capacity problem of Eq. (3) using the precoding matrix
presented in Sec. III-A. We generalize the problem into an achievable secrecy rate problem for
arbitrary input distribution. To this end, we present the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Define I (γ) = I (s;√γ s+ n), ν = k − r − s, p = {p1, . . . , pma}, {ωi} =
diag
(
ΩHΩ
)
. When input s of a MIMOME system is a random vector with zero mean entries
and identity correlation matrix, by using the precoding matrix W defined in Eq. (4), we can
achieve the following secrecy rate for an arbitrary distribution of s
maximize
p
∑
i:bi>ei
[
I
(
b2i
ων+i
pν+i
)
− I
(
e2i
ων+i
pν+i
)]
+
k∑
j=k−r+1
I
(
1
ωj
pj
)
subject to :
∑
i:bi>ei
pν+i +
k∑
j=k−r+1
pj ≤ PT
(12)
Proof: See Appendix A.
We observe that, the application of the proposed precoding matrix can transform the MIMOME
problem into a distributed secrecy rate problem for a bank of parallel channels. We note that,
for a given alphabet set, in general the above optimization problem should be jointly optimized
over the input probability distribution and the power allocation. However, practical modulation
constellations are generally constrained to be equi-probable. Therefore, here we will consider
equi-probable input alphabet and focus on power allocation optimization. Next we propose a
power allocation algorithm to solve the above optimization problem.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION ALGORITHM FOR ARBITRARY INPUT DISTRIBUTION
Even though the above optimization problem is convex for Gaussian input, for an arbitrary
input distribution, this is in general not the case. In addition, the lack of closed-form expression
for mutual information makes the problem even more difficult to solve. In order to find an efficient
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sub-optimal solution, we will revert to the decomposition technique. We note that, without the
sum power constraint, the optimization problem (12) can be decoupled into a number of parallel
problems each involving only one variable pi. However, the sum power constraint compels us to
solve a larger optimization problem jointly involving multiple variables. For problem such as (12)
involving a complex constraint, a dual decomposition method [?], [?] based on the Lagrangian
of the objective function enables us to readily decompose the problem into a number of parallel
sub-problems each involving a single variable. These subproblems are linked through a master
problem that updates the dual variable during each iterations of the subproblems. By introducing
a dual variable µ, we can write the Lagrangian of the optimization problem (12) by relaxing the
coupling constraint as follows
maximize
p
∑
i:bi>ei
[
I
(
b2i
ων+i
pν+i
)
− I
(
e2i
ων+i
pν+i
)]
+
k∑
j=k−r+1
I
(
1
ωj
pj
)
− µ
( ∑
i:bi>ei
pν+i +
k∑
j=k−r+1
pj
)
+ µPT
subject to : pi ≥ 0.
(13)
Note that, the above optimization problem is decoupled in terms of pi. We obtain the following
two subproblems.
Subproblem 1 : for all i such that bi > ei
maximize
pi≥0
[
I
(
b2i
ων+i
pν+i
)
− I
(
e2i
ων+i
pν+i
)]
− µpν+i (14)
Subproblem 2 : for all j = k − r + 1, . . . , k
maximize
pi≥0
I
(
1
ωj
pj
)
− µpj (15)
Subproblems 1 and 2 are linked through the master problem which is the dual optimization
problem of (12). The master problem updates the value of the dual variables µ. Let p∗i denote
the solution found from the subproblems. The master problem can be written as follows
Master Problem :
minimize
µ≥0
∑
i:bi>ei
[
I
(
b2i
ων+i
p∗ν+i
)
− I
(
e2i
ων+i
p∗ν+i
)]
+
k∑
j=k−r+1
I
(
1
ωj
p∗j
)
− µ
( ∑
i:bi>ei
p∗ν+i +
k∑
j=k−r+1
p∗j
)
+ µPT .
(16)
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Subproblem 2 is a convex problem and can be solve optimally. However, in general subproblem
1 is not convex. Even though subproblems 1 and 2 only involve single variable, in most situations,
a closed form or analytic expression for the mutual information is not known for an arbitrary
input distribution. In order to solve subproblems 1 and 2, we resort to a recent result on finite-
alphabet research [?], [?] that relates the mutual information and the minimum mean square
error (MMSE) at the receiver through
dI (ρ)
dρ
= mmse (ρ) . (17)
Note that the function “mmse” for different discrete constellations (e.g., M -PSK, M -QAM etc.,
where M is the number of constellation points) has been given in [?]. Using Eq. (17), the
optimum value of pi in subproblems 2 can be solved from the following equations
1
ωj
mmse
(
1
ωj
p∗j
)
− µ = 0, for j = k − r + 1, . . . , k. (18)
Eq. (18) can be further expressed as follows
p∗j = ωj mmse
−1 (min {1, µ ωj}) , for j = k − r + 1, . . . , k (19)
where we used the fact that mmse−1(1) = 0.
For subproblem 1, we can derive the following necessary condition for optimality
b2i
ων+i
mmse
(
b2i
ων+i
p∗ν+i
)
− e
2
i
ων+i
mmse
(
e2i
ων+i
p∗ν+i
)
− µ = 0,
for i : bi > ei (20)
Next, we propose a sufficient condition for the optimality of the solution of Eq. (20). In this
regard, we define the following MMSE difference function
fmmseD(p, bi, ei, ων+i) =
b2i
ων+i
mmse
(
b2i
ων+i
p∗ν+i
)
− e
2
i
ων+i
mmse
(
e2i
ων+i
p∗ν+i
)
. (21)
We note that, a similar condition has been proposed in [?] [see Theorem 6 in [?]] for a parallel
Gaussian wiretap channel with M -PAM inputs.
Proposition 2: If the MMSE difference function in Eq. (21) admits a unique zero p′ and is
strictly monotonically decreasing for 0 ≤ p ≤ p′, then the optimal solution {p∗ν+i} of Eq. (20)
can be given as follows
when b2i ≤ e2i
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p∗ν+i = 0
when b2i > e
2
i
p∗ν+i = p
′ ifµ = 0
b2i
ων+i
mmse
(
b2i
ων+i
p∗ν+i
)
− e
2
i
ων+i
mmse
(
e2i
ων+i
p∗ν+i
)
= µ, 0 < p < p′ ifµ > 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
In following proposition, we describe a condition for the MMSE difference function to admit
a unique zero solution.
Proposition 3: If g(ρ) = ρmmse(ρ) is a strictly uni-modal function and bi > ei, then the
MMSE difference function fmmseD(p, bi, ei, ων+i) admits a unique zero solution for p > 0.
Proof: See Appendix C.
In Figure 6, we present the plot of g(ρ) = ρmmse(ρ) vs. ρ for BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM, and
64-QAM input constellations. We observe that g(ρ) of all four constellations shows strictly uni-
modality in the region of interest. Furthermore, in Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10, we illustrate graphically
the MMSE difference function fmmseD(p, a) vs. power p for various values of a = e2iupslopeb2i . Here,
we also assume ων+i = 1 without any loss of generality. We observe that, the MMSE difference
function exhibits strictly monotonically decreasing behavior in the range 0 ≤ p ≤ p′ for all
four constellations. Based on Propositions 2 and 3, and Figures 6-10, we see that the optimality
criterion described in proposition 2 holds for common constellations of BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM,
and 64-QAM. Therefore, the solution of subproblem 1 in Eq. (19) will be unique for at least
these four constellations.
The combined algorithm to solve the optimization problem (12) is presented in Algorithm (1).
Algorithm 1 Dual decomposition algorithm for (12)
1) Initialize dual variable µ ≥ 0.
2) Find solution of subproblem 1 and 2 by solving (20) and (19), respectively.
3) Update dual variable as
µ =
[
µ+ α
( ∑
i:bi>ei
pν+i +
k∑
j=k−r+1
pj − PT
)]+
4) Go to Step 2 until stopping criterion is reached.
We note that the master problem in Eq. (16) is differentiable with respect to the dual variable
µ. Therefore, in Step 3 of the above algorithm, we use the gradient method to update the dual
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variable. Here, the parameter α > 0 denotes an appropriate stepsize, which can be either a
constant or time-varying. In our simulation, we choose a fixed stepsize α. If the stepsize is
sufficiently small, then the solution of the above algorithm will converge to the solution of the
optimal dual variable µ∗. A detail description on the choice of stepsize and stopping criterion
can be found in [?], [?] and the references therein. If the original optimization problem in Eq.
(12) is convex, then the duality gap will be zero. Therefore, the solution of the dual problem in
Eq. (16) will also provide the optimal solution of the original problem. However, if the original
problem is not convex, then there exists a positive duality gap and the solution of Eq. (16) will
be a suboptimal solution of the original problem.
V. SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS OF MIMOME SYSTEM
A. Gaussian Input Case
In this section, we will present the power allocation problem for the special case of Gaussian
input distribution based on the framework considered above. Even though the result for Gaussian
input is well known [?], [?], [?], results in this section will provide additional insight for the
finite-alphabet input scenarios to be considered later.
For Gaussian input, the MMSE equation is simply
mmse(γ) =
1
1 + γ
. (22)
Let us denote {pgi} as the optimum power allocation for Gaussian input. Based on Eq. (22),
solutions of subproblem 1 can be found by solving the following equation
b2i e
2
i
b2i − e2i
1
ων+1
(
pgν+1
)2
+
1
b2i − e2i
pgν+1 +
[
ων+1
b2i − e2i
− 1
µ
]
= 0. (23)
Thus, the optimal power allocation is
pgν+i =

0, if
1
µ
≤ ων+i
b2i − e2i
1
2
√(ων+i
b2i e
2
i
)2
+ 4
ων+i
b2i e
2
i
(b2i − e2i )
(
1
µ
− ων+i
b2i − e2i
)
− ων+i
b2i e
2
i
 , if 1
µ
>
ων+i
b2i − e2i
.
(24)
Similarly, based on Eq. (22), solution of subproblem 2 can be found as
pgi =

0, if
1
µ
≤ ωi
1
µ
− ωi, if 1
µ
> ωi
. (25)
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We notice that, the solution of subproblem 2 presented in Eq. (25) can also be obtained from
Eq. (23) for by replacing b2i with 1 and e
2
i with 0. In the absence of eavesdropper, the solution of
this simplified problem is the famous water-filling solution as given in Eq. (25), where the base
level is ωi and water level is the inverse of the dual variable
1
µ
. When the security constraint
is present, however, the problem takes on an interesting structure. In such case, we can still
consider the water level as
1
µ
. However, we will use
ων+i
b2i − e2i
as a base level to take into account
the additional constraint due to secrecy. For the parallel channels j = k − r + 1, . . . , k, with
components only towards Bob’s direction, the base level will still be ωj (since, b2j−ν = 1 and
e2j−ν = 0). Similar to water-filling, we will allocate power only when the water level is above
the base level. However, the power level in this case will not be the difference between the water
level and base level, i.e.
1
µ
− ων+i
b2i − e2i
. Instead, it will be a non-linear function of the difference
as given in Eq. (24). As a result, the achievable secrecy rate can be written as
Rgs =
∑
i:bi>ei
log
1 +
b2i
ων+i
pgν+i
1 +
e2i
ων+i
pgν+i
+ k∑
j=k−r+1
log
(
1 +
1
ωj
pgj
)
. (26)
B. Low SNR Approximation
1) Second order optimal signaling: For second order optimal signaling [?], the first and the
second order derivatives of the mutual information achieved at zero SNR matches with those
achieved using Gaussian input. In general, quadratic symmetric signaling such as QPSK or any
other signaling distribution that can be written as a mixture of QPSK (i.e., M -QAM, for M ≥ 4)
are second order optimal. For second order optimal signaling, the low SNR approximation of
MMSE (i.e., the first derivative of mutual information) is the same as that of Gaussian signaling.
Hence, we can use the same water-filling power allocation solution as presented in Eq. (24),
(25) in Section V-A.
2) Non-second order optimal signaling: 1-D signaling schemes such as BPSK and M -PAM
are not second order optimal. A low SNR approximation of such signaling is given in [?] as
mmse (ρ) = 1− 2 ρ+ o (ρ2) . (27)
Based on the above equation, low SNR power allocation
{
plowi
}
for non-second order optimal
signaling are given below in two cases:
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plowν+i =

0, when
1
µ
≤ ων+i
b2i − e2i
ων+i
2
µ
(
1
µ
− ων+i
b2i − e2i
)
when
1
µ
>
ων+i
b2i − e2i
, {i : bi > ei} (28)
plowi =

0, when
1
µ
≤ ωi
ωi
2
µ
(
1
µ
− ωi
)
, when
1
µ
> ωi
, i = k − r + 1, . . . , k. (29)
The achievable secrecy rate at low SNR can be approximated as follows
Rlows =
∑
i:bi>ei
(
b2i − e2i
) (
plowν+i −
(
plowν+i
)2)
+
k∑
j=k−r+1
(
plowj −
(
plowj
)2)
. (30)
We notice that, similar to the case of Gaussian and second-order optimal signaling, we can
use a water-filling strategy with water level
1
µ
and base level
ων+i
b2i − e2i
and assuming b2j−ν = 1
and e2j−ν = 0 for j = k − r + 1, . . . , k. The power level is still function of
1
µ
− ων+i
b2i − e2i
,
which is the difference between water level and base level. The functions are now slightly
different in (Eq. (28) and (29)).
C. High SNR Approximation
1) rank (He) = ma : In this case dim (Sb) = r = 0. For the power constraint in Eq. (12),
we get the following complementary slackness condition
µ
( ∑
i:bi>ei
ων+i pν+i − PT
)
= 0. (31)
Based on proposition 2, the optimal power p∗ for maximum secrecy satisfies p∗ ≤ p′. Therefore,
at very high SNR when PT →∞, secrecy rate for finite-alphabet input is maximized by using a
fraction of the total available power. The power constraint inequality becomes a strict inequality.
In the above complementary slackness condition, we attain µ = 0. Denoting high SNR power
allocation as phighi , we re-write Eq. (20) as
b2i mmse
(
b2i p
high
ν+i
)
= e2i mmse
(
e2i p
high
ν+i
)
. (32)
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In [?], based on the sub-optimum estimator sˆ(y, ρ) = arg min
sk
∣∣y −√ρ sk∣∣ the following
MMSE approximation at high SNR is found:
mmse(ρ) ≈ K exp
{
−d
2
4
ρ
}
, (33)
in which K is a constant and d is the minimum distance between two signaling points in the
discrete unit variance input constellation.
Reference [?] also provided a table containing formula for calculating d of different finite-
alphabet constellations. Using Eq. (33), we obtain the following high SNR approximation of
power allocation
phighν+i =
log σ2i
d2
4
(b2i − e2i )
ων+i
, for i such that bi > ei. (34)
In [?], it was observed that, at high SNR regime, the power allocation for parallel Gaussian
channel with finite-alphabet demonstrates a channel inversion characteristic. In other words,
stronger channels receive less power allocation. This is because the mutual information of a M -
ary constellation cannot exceed log2M bits/s/Hz, Thus, there is little incentive to allocate more
power to a channel once the mutual information is near saturation. Instead, additional power is
better allocated to weaker channels for higher rate. In Eq. (34), we observe a similar channel
inversion phenomenon, although in this case, the effective channel
(b2i − e2i )
ων+i
. This is in sharp
contrast to both the water-filling power allocation at low SNR regime and the power allocation
for Gaussian input (see Eq. (28)), where the power allocation was proportional to the effective
channel.
2) rank (He) < ma: Based on Eq. (33), mmse(ρ) decays exponentially to zero as ρ → ∞.
From Eq. (18), therefore, we find that µ → 0 as PT → ∞. Hence, for the subset of parallel
channels, i : bi > ei, Eq. (34) will still provide a high SNR approximation of power allocation.
The subset of parallel channels j = k−r+1, . . . , k are in the subspace Sb. For these channels,
there are no components in Eve’s subspace and a similar channel inversion style power allocation
can be achieved as presented in [?] with an effective channel
1
ωj
. For an M -ary constellation,
mutual information for these channels will become close to log2M at high SNR.
In summary, for the subset of parallel channels i : bi > ei, a channel inversion based power
allocation based on the effective channel
b2i − e2i
ων+i
will be performed, whereas for the set of
parallel channels j = k − r + 1, . . . , k, a channel inversion type power allocation based on
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effective channel gains 1/ωj will be performed. A high SNR approximation of the achievable
secrecy rate for the case rank (He) < ma is given by
Rhighs ≈ r logM +
∑
i:bi>ei
[
I
(
b2i
ων+i
phighν+i
)
− I
(
e2i
ων+i
phighν+i
)]
. (35)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Transmitter with Accurate Eavesdropper CSI
Without any loss of generality, we assume equal noise power level at receivers of both Bob
and Eve. We also assume that Alice has full CSI of both Bob and Eve. Our numerical results
average over 500 channel realization, where each entry of both Bob’s and Eve’s channel matrices
is i.i.d. complex random Gaussian variable with zero mean and unit variance.
In Fig. 2, we present numerical test results for a 5× 5× 5 MIMOME system. In this test, we
ensure that each realization of He is non-singular, i.e., rank(He) = 5 = ma. Since, rank(He) =
ma, there is no parallel channel only directed at Bob. In addition to result for the proposed power
allocation (PA) algorithm, we also present results obtained using the water-filling PA of Section
V-A and results from equal power over all channels (uniform PA) [?]. We also present high SNR
approximation results for every tested constellation as well as the low SNR approximation result
for BPSK. For other constellations (QPSK, 16-QAM and 64-QAM), low SNR approximation
gives the same result as the water-filling PA.
As seen in Fig. 2, at high SNR, power allocations according to water-filling and uniform
strategies would drop the secrecy rate to almost zero. This result is intuitive. For finite-alphabet,
the achievable mutual information at high power approaches the saturation value of log2M .
For Gaussian input, however, the mutual information or the capacity increases monotonically
with increasing power. Since both water-filling and uniform strategies assume a Gaussian input
distribution, at high SNR both schemes would use more power to transmit signals. This strategy
drops the secrecy rate asymptotically to zero as the difference in mutual information between
Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve narrows with at very high SNR. Fig. 2 also indicates that the high
SNR approximation analysis closely matches the secrecy rate at high SNR regime. Similarly, the
secrecy rate at low SNR is also closely approximated by the low-SNR approximation analytical
result.
Fig. 3 presents test results for a 5×5×3 MIMOME system. Because in this case rank(He) <
ma, there are parallel channel components only directed towards Bob. Therefore, results obtained
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in this case are different from Fig. 2. Specifically, we observe that, even though secrecy rates
using water-filling and uniform PA schemes at high SNR drops from the maximum attainable
value, they do not approaches zero as in Fig. 2. The reason is due to the existence of channels
directed only at Bob. For the parallel channels with components along both at Bob’s and Eve’s
direction, the difference in mutual information between Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve narrows
at high SNR. However, for each of the parallel channels with components only in Bob’s direction,
the secrecy rate would approach log2M . Therefore, at high SNR the total secrecy rate approaches
r log2M . Moreover, our proposed PA algorithm can achieve some additional non-zero secrecy
rate from the channels directed at both Bob and Eve, in addition to those parallel channels only
in Bob’s direction.
Both Fig. 2 and 3 indicate that when using Gaussian assumption for finite-alphabet inputs,
there is a threhold SNR above which the achievable secrecy rate starting to decrease. The value of
this threshold SNR is higher for the higher order constellation. Therefore, by adaptively switching
to the next higher order modulation format once we reach the threshold point for a particular
constellation, we will be able to use Gaussian water-filling PA algorithm even for finite-alphabet
inputs. We also notice similar threshold SNR for uniform PA. In addition, uniform PA also
achieves secrecy rate close to the water-filling PA. Therefore, a very simple but near optimal
strategy would be to use uniform power allocation and start switching to the next higher order
modulation once above each threshold SNR.
B. Transmitter with Partial Eavesdropper CSI
Thus far, our analysis assumes that Alice possesses full channel information of Eve. In practice,
however, Eve’s CSI or even the presence of a passive Eve is difficult to determine. Therefore,
in this section, we will numerically evaluate the scenario when Alice only has access to partial
(statistical) information regarding Eve’s channel state. In particular, let Eve’s channel consists
of
He = Hˆe + Ee.
Here, Hˆe is Eve’s mean CSI known to Alice whereas Ee is the CSI uncertainty which is modeled
as zero mean white Gaussian noise with variance σ2e , i.e., Ee ∼ CN (0, σ2eI).
In this case, if Alice performs power allocation based on the known observation Hˆe by
disregarding the uncertainty, the power allocation may not be optimal. In fact, Alice may even
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lose secrecy. In the following proposition, we present the achievable ergodic secrecy rate for a
given power allocation p.
Proposition 4: For a given power allocation p based on the known observation Hˆe without
considering the uncertainty, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate Rsec(p) can be given as follows
Rsec(p) =
∑
i:bi>ei
[
I
(
b2i
ων+i
pν+i
)
− E
{
I
(
(e2i + e˜ν+i)
2
σν+iων+i
pν+i
)}]
+
k∑
j=k−r+1
[
I
(
1
ωj
pj
)
− E
{
I
(
e˜2j
σjωj
pj
)}]
(36)
Here, e˜i ∼ CN (0, σ2e ωi), i = 1, . . . , k are i.i.d. random. Also, σ2i = 1 + σ2e
(
k∑
`=1
p` − pi
)
.
Proof: See Appendix D.
From Eq. (36) we notice that, data symbols sk−r+1, . . . , sk - previously only observed by Bob,
are also seen by Eve now. In addition, for the symbols sν+i, . . . , sν+s - observed by both Bob
and Eve, an additional uncertainty term e˜ν+i is added to the mutual information of Eve.
In Fig. 4 and 5, we present test results of achievable ergodic secrecy rate for different values
of variance of channel uncertainty, for 5× 5× 5 and 5× 5× 3 MISOME systems, respectively.
Here, Alice is only aware of the mean CSI Hˆe and use this CSI for power control without
considering the uncertainty component Ee. We present test results for different values of available
transmission power. Both Fig. 4 and 5 indicate that the achievable ergodic secrecy rate decreases
with larger channel uncertainty. In addition, we observe from Fig. 4 that the achievable ergodic
secrecy rate plots for transmission power PT ≥ 5 stays the same. This is because Alice does not
require all available power to transmit at higher SNR. Hence, the power allocation stays the same
at higher SNR. However, in Fig. 5, we observe that the achievable ergodic secrecy rate in fact
decreases with larger transmission power for PT > 10 dB. In this case, rank
(
Hˆe
)
< ma. When
Alice only uses this information for power control without considering the uncertainty, Alice will
likely allocate more power to the bank of parallel channels which only has components toward
Bob. At high SNR, Alice will allocate more powers to these channels. However, as shown in
Eq. (36), because of channel uncertainty Ee, Eve now also possesses components along these
channels. In other words, Eve can also receive signals from these channels. As SNR grows large,
the mutual information for finite alphabet saturates to log2M . As a result, Eve can receive nearly
full data information in these channel and consequently, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate will
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decrease at high SNR.
We note that, in order to maximize the achievable ergodic secrecy rate under channel uncer-
tainty, one needs to solve the following optimization problem
maximize
p
s∑
i=1
[
I
(
b2i
ων+i
pν+i
)
− E
{
I
(
(e2i + e˜ν+i)
2
σν+iων+i
pν+i
)}]
+
k∑
j=k−r+1
[
I
(
1
ωj
pj
)
− E
{
I
(
e˜2j
σjωj
pj
)}]
subject to :
s∑
i=1
pν+i +
k∑
j=k−r+1
pj ≤ PT .
Investigation of this optimization problem is beyond the scope of this work. However, in [?], a
power allocation algorithm to maximize the achievable ergodic secrecy rate under arbitrary input
distribution is provided for a multiple-input single-output and single-eavesdropper scenario. An
extension of the power allocation algorithm provided in [?] can also be used to solve the above
optimization problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work considers the effect of practical finite-alphabet inputs on the secrecy performance of
an MIMOME system. Our investigation led to the application of a precoding matrix to convert
the MIMOME system into a bank of parallel channels so as to reformulate the achievable
secrecy rate problem. We proposed a decentralized dual decomposition and a corresponding
power allocation algorithm to maximize the achievable secrecy rate based on the proposed
precoding for channel transformation. We analyzed the Gaussian input as a special case and
provided a water-filling inspired power allocation strategy. Furthermore, we derived analytical
results of achievable secrecy rate based on approximations at low and high SNR scenarios. Our
results show that power allocation strategy based on Gaussian input is far from optimal when
applied blindly in finite-alphabet input situation and may in fact be very risky by driving the
secrecy rate to zero at higher SNR.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
An achievable secrecy rate for an arbitrary distribution of input x can be obtained by solving
the following optimization problem
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maximize
Kx
I (x; yb)− I (x; ye)
subject to : Kx  0, Kx = KHx
tr (Kx) ≤ PT
(37)
When we apply the precoding matrix W from Eq. (4), the input of the system becomes x = Ws.
The objective function of the above optimization problem can be written as follows
I (x; yb)− I (x; ye) (38)
=I (s; HbWs + nb)− I (s; HeWs + ne) (39)
=I
(
s; H˜bs + n˜b
)
− I
(
s; H˜es + n˜e
)
(40)
=
[
s∑
i=1
I (b2i pk−r−s+i)+ k∑
j=k−r+1
I (pj)
]
−
[
k−r−s∑
`=1
I (p`) +
s∑
i=1
I (e2i pk−r−s+i)
]
(41)
=
k∑
j=k−r+1
I (pj) +
s∑
i=1
[I (b2i pk−r−s+i)− I (e2i pk−r−s+i)]− k−r−s∑
`=1
I (p`) . (42)
Note that (40) follows from (39) since linear unitary transformation of channel outputs preserves
mutual information. Because (40) represents the difference in mutual information between a
subset of parallel channels, we can rewrite (40) into the summation form of (41).
Since s is a random vector with identity correlation matrix, Kx = E
[
xxH
]
= WWH , we
have tr (Kx) =
∑k
i=1 ωipi. Therefore, we can reformulate the optimization problem in (37) as
follows
maximize
{pi}
s∑
i=1
[I (b2i pk−r−s+i)− I (e2i pk−r−s+i)]− k−r−s∑
i=1
I (pi) +
k∑
i=k−r+1
I (pi)
subject to :
k∑
i=1
ωipi ≤ PT
(43)
Note that the above optimization problem is a distributed power allocation problem for the
bank of parallel channels shown in Fig. 1, where the variables {pi}’s are coupled through
the total power constraint. Because I(.) ≥ 0, we have optimum power allocation p∗i = 0 for
i = 1, . . . , k− r−s. In addition, since I(γ) are monotonically increasing in γ, I (b2i pk−r−s+i)−
September 17, 2018 DRAFT
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS, APRIL 4, 2011 21
I (e2i pk−r−s+i) ≤ 0 whenever bi ≤ ei, hence p∗i = 0, for all i with bi ≤ ei. Furthermore, from
Fig. 1, we observe that symbols sk+1, . . . , sma are transmitted towards the direction of Sn and is
not part of the optimization problem (43). Hence, it will be wasteful to expend any transmission
power to transmit these symbols. Therefore, p∗i = 0 for i = k+1, . . . ,ma. By change of variables,
p′ = ωi pi, and then replacing p′ with p, we obtain the optimization problem in Eq. (12).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
If b2i ≤ e2i , the difference in mutual information between Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve
channel will be negative. Hence, no secrecy is possible. As a result, the optimal power allocation
should be zero.
When b2i > e
2
i , it is possible to achieve a positive secrecy rate. If, in the solution of the
original problem (12), the sum power constraint inequality becomes a strict inequality, then
µ = 0 according to the KKT condition [?]. Such condition can occur at high SNR regime.
Therefore, the solution of problem (20) will be achieved by the power allocation p′ that renders
the MMSE difference function in Eq. (21) zero. If the MMSE difference function admits a
unique zero solution, then the solution of Eq. (20) will be optimal, i.e., p∗ν+i = p
′.
If on the other hand, the sum power constraint in the original problem admits an equality,
then µ > 0. If the MMSE difference function is monotonically decreasing for 0 ≤ p ≤ p′, then
the function fmmseD(p, bi, ei, ων+i) − µ will be zero for a power allocation value p∗ that is less
than p′. Now, if MMSE difference function is strictly monotonically decreasing, then the power
allocation solution will be unique. Therefore, the solution of Eq. (20) will be optimal.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Define, ρ1 = bi p and ρ2 = ei p. First, we will prove that the difference function, gD(ρ1, ρ2) =
g(ρ1)− g(ρ2) admits a unique zero for p > 0.
Assume that the strictly unimodal function g(ρ) is strictly monotonically increasing for ρ ≤ m
and strictly monotonically decreasing for ρ > m. When, ρ2 < ρ1 ≤ m, the difference function
gD(ρ1, ρ2) cannot be zero due to the strictly monotonically increasing nature of the function
g(ρ). Similarly, when ρ1 > ρ2 > m, the difference function gD(ρ1, ρ2) cannot be zero due to the
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strictly monotonically decreasing nature of the function g(ρ). Therefore, the difference function
gD(ρ1, ρ2) can be zero only when ρ2 < m < ρ1.
Suppose, for p = p′, the difference function gD(bi p, ei p′) equals zero. For p > p′, g(bi p) >
g(bi p
′) and g(ei p) < g(ei p′) due to the strictly unimodal properties of g(ρ). Hence, when ρ2 <
m < ρ1, the difference function gD(ρ1, ρ2) = g(ρ1)− g(ρ2) cannot be zero for p > p′. The same
argument holds for any point p < p′. Therefore, when bi > ei, the difference function gD(ρ1, ρ2)
admits a unique zero for p > 0. Hence the MMSE difference function fmmseD(p, bi, ei, ων+i) has
a unique zero solution for p > 0
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
With He = Hˆe + Ee, Eq. (9) can be written as
y˜e = H˜e s + Ψ
H
e EeWs + n˜e (44)
Here, H˜e = ΨHe HˆeW = Σe
[
I 0
]
P1/2. Now, the second term in the above equation can be
expressed as ΨHe EeWs = E˜eP
1/2s, where, E˜e = EˆeB and Eˆe = ΨHe EeΨa. We can decompose
E˜e as a sum of two matrices, where the first matrix is a diagonal matrix containing the diagonal
elements of E˜e. The second matrix contains the non-diagonal entries of E˜e and contains all zero
elements in its diagonal. The decomposition is given below
E˜e =

e˜1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
0 e˜2
. . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
... . . .
...
0 0 . . . e˜k 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
... . . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0

+

0 e˜12 . . . e˜1k 0 . . . 0
e˜21 0
. . . e˜2k 0
. . . 0
...
...
... . . .
...
e˜k1 e˜k2 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
e˜(k+1)1 e˜(k+1)2 . . . e˜(k+1)k 0 . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
... . . .
...
e˜me1 e˜me2 . . . e˜mek 0 . . . 0

(45)
Here, e˜ij ∼ CN (0, σ2eωj). Based on the above decomposition and replacing pi with
pi
ωi
, the
i-th entry of the vector y˜e can be expressed as follows
y˜ei = (e
′
i + e˜i)
1√
ωi
√
pisi + gi + nei (46)
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Here, gi =
k∑
`=1,`6=i
e˜i`
1√
ω`
√
p`s` and e′i can be expressed as
e′i =

1, i = 1, . . . , k − r − s
ei−ν , i = ν + 1, . . . , ν + s and ν = k − r − s
0, i = k − r + 1, . . . ,me
(47)
Assume that the eavesdropper is performing conventional decoding on each of these parallel
branch by considering the cross terms as a part of noise. Then the achievable ergodic secrecy rate
for a given power allocation p can be written as in Eq. (36). If in case, Eve employs advanced
decoding scheme, e.g. successive interference cancellation etc. then Eq. (36) will serve as a
upper bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate.
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Fig. 1. Precoding matrix W = ΨaBP
1/2 converts MIMOME channel to a bank of parallel channels
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Fig. 2. 5× 5× 5 MIMOME system
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Fig. 4. Secrecy Rate of a 5× 5× 5 MIMOME system with partial Eve’s CSI
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Fig. 5. Secrecy Rate of a 5× 5× 3 MIMOME system with partial Eve’s CSI
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Fig. 7. MMSE difference function fD(p, a) for different values of a = e2iupslopeb2i for BPSK
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Fig. 8. MMSE difference function fD(p, a) for different values of a = e2iupslopeb2i for QPSK
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Fig. 9. MMSE difference function fD(p, a) for different values of a = e2iupslopeb2i for 16-QAM
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Fig. 10. MMSE difference function fD(p, a) for different values of a = e2iupslopeb2i for 64-QAM
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